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COMMENTS
THE DOCTRINE OF SPECIAL LEGISLATION IN
PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, the power to regulate land use through zoning and other regula-
tory schemes is virtually unquestioned. In Pennsylvania, the constitutional
validity of zoning was settled as early as 1926 in White's Appeal,' which
held that the exercise of the police power through zoning was valid if
"clearly necessary to preserve the health, safety or morals of the people." 2
Even though this standard was later modified to the requirement that a
zoning ordinance need only bear a "substantial relationship" to the health,
safety, or general welfare of the community,3 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has continued to recognize that
an owner of property is: still entitled in Pennsylvania to certain un-
alienable constitutional rights of liberty and property. These include
a right to use his own home [or property] in any way he desires,
provided he does not (1) violate any provision of the Federal or
State Constitutions; or (2) create a nuisance; or (3) violate any
covenant, restriction or easement; or (4) violate any laws or zoning
or police regulations which are constitutional.
4
From this balancing of individual and governmental interests has emerged
the general rule that zoning ordinances are constitutional whenever they
bear a substantial relation to the public welfare and are not unjustly dis-
criminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, or confiscatory in their application
to a particular piece of property.5
Despite these articulated limitations on the police power, one com-
_..entator has noted that until the mid-1960's, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court permitted, at least in a practical sense, the unfettered exercise of
broad local governmental discretion in the zoning area.0 Stressing that
1. 287 Pa. 259, 134 A. 409 (1926).
2. Id. at 265, 134 A. at 411.
3. See National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa. 504,
527, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965).
4. Lord Appeal, 368 Pa. 121, 125, 81 A.2d 533, 535 (1951) ; see Gallagher v.
Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 306, 247 A.2d 572, 574 (1968) ; Lhormer v. Bowen,
410 Pa. 508, 512, 188 A.2d 747, 749 (1963) ; Lened Homes, Inc. v. Department of
Licenses, 386 Pa. 50, 54, 123 A.2d 406, 407 (1956).
5. Bilbar Constr. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 393 Pa. 62, 74, 141 A.2d
851,857 (1958).
6. Comment, The Pennsylvania Supreme Court and Exclusionary Suburban
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zoning ordinances were legislative enactments passed by duly elected
representatives, the court was reluctant to substitute its substantive judg-
ment for that of the zoning authority.7 Consequently, a zoning action
would be upset only when it involved the most flagrant abuse of legislative
discretion.
8
With the advent of the exclusionary zoning cases in the mid-1960's,
however, the court became more willing to involve itself in the substantive
issues of zoning.9 As the court began to examine more closely the moti-
vation of local zoning authorities in cases involving allegations of exclusion-
ary intent,10 it also assumed a more active role in cases where it was alleged
that zoning actions were unjustly discriminatory toward a particular prop-
erty." In a series of decisions involving alleged discriminatory behavior
by local governments against individual land owners, the supreme court
developed the doctrine of special legislation, which can be summarized as
follows: if a zoning ordinance is aimed directly at a particular piece of
property to prevent the use of that property for a formerly lawful purpose,
it is held to be special legislation and is thus inapplicable to that particular
piece -of property.
12
This Comment reviews the various decisions in which the special
legislation doctrine has been relied upon and examines some of the prac-
tical problems which have arisen in connection with its use. After a dis-
cussion of the theoretical predicates of special legislation and an analysis
of cases decided under that doctrine, the Comment examines problems
stemming from the interpretation of language employed in several of the
cases. Attention is then focused upon two problems concerning the proof
of special legislation: 1) the dilemma faced by challengers because most
of the evidence, or sou-rces thereof, is in the hands of the defendant mu-
nicipal officials; and 2) the failure of the Municipalities Planning Code
(MPC) 13 to assist the challenger in obtaining proof due to the absence
of adequate discovery provisions. Next, the Comment addresses the
question of the choice of the forum in which special legislation challenges.
should be initiated. Finally, the Comment briefly discusses the proper
remedy to be applied after a successful special legislation challenge.
7. Id. at 513, citing Tidewater Oil Co. v. Poore, 395 Pa. 89, 149 A.2d 636
(1959) ; Harrisburg v. Pass, 372 Pa. 318, 93 A.2d 447 (1953).
8. Id., citing Baronoff v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 385 Pa. 110, 122 A.2d 65 (1956).
9. See, e.g., Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh
Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown
Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
10. See note 9 supra.
11. See notes 46-111 and accompanying text infra.
12. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 628, 105 A.2d 299,
302-03 (1954).
13. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972). The MPC, approved
Julv 31, 1968, and subsequently amended, was designed to replace the multitude of
enabling statutes which formerly governed zoning in the commonwealth.
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Before the special legislation cases can be analyzed, it is necessary
to examine certain basic doctrines of zoning law from which the doctrine
of special legislation in Pennsylvania evolved. These principles include
the vested rights doctrine, the pending ordinance principle, and the doc-
trine of spot zoning.
Under the doctrine of "vested rights," when an applicant has received
a permit to erect a building or conduct a certain use then permitted by
existing ordinances, and has proceeded to act in good faith under that
permit, he thereby acquires a vested property right which will be protected
by the constitution on the theory that the disturbance of such a right would
deprive the holder thereof of his property without due process of law.'
4
As to the extent of work or other action required before a property right
vests, the leading Pennsylvania case on point, Herskovits v. Irvin,15 held
that when, in reliance upon a permit, an owner in good faith incurs obli-
gations and begins work, his rights are then vested.' 6
At the heart of the vested rights doctrine is the good faith reliance
by the land owner upon existing law, and the equitable protection of
expenditures made in that reliance. The Herskovits decision distinguished
cases where permits were not obtained in good faith, but merely in an-
ticipation of an amendment to the zoning ordinance.' 7 It follows that where
14. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930). See generally
Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13 (1973); R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE
ch. 8 (1970) ; Comment, Building Permits - Vested Rights Thereunder in Pennsyl-
vania - A New Rule, 73 DICK. L. REV. 578 (1969).
15. 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930). In Herskovits, plaintiff applied for and
received an excavation permit to begin work on a planned six-story apartment
building which complied with zoning and building ordinances. Id. at 158, 149 A. at 196.
He then contracted for labor and materials for the erection of the building and
excavation was begun. Id. Thereafter, an amendment to the zoning ordinance was
proposed which would have limited the height of all buildings in the area, and on the
basis of that pending amendment plaintiff's permit was revoked and a "final" permit
was refused. Id. at 158-59, 149 A. at 196.
16. Id. at 160, 149 A. at 197. The court stated:
While it is true that some of the cases . . . go on the theory that the letting of a
contract, or even the building of foundations, is not of itself such work as to
create a vested right, we follow the rule ... that a property interest arises where,
after permit granted [sic], a landowner begins construction of a building and
incurs liability for future work.
Id. at 162, 149 A. at 197-98 (citation omitted).
A more recent case, Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d
572 (1968), held that a properly issued permit cannot be revoked on the basis of a
subsequent zoning amendment whether or not the landowner has incurred costs in
reliance upon the permit. Id. at 306, 247 A.2d at 574. Although Gallagher appears
to eliminate the traditional necessity for showing something more than the mere
acquisition of a permit, the case involved a subsequent zoning amendment aimed di-
rectly at preventing the landowner's previously lawful use. As will be discussed (see
text accompanying notes 76-83 infra), it was a case involving special legislation.
It is thus submitted that Gallagher was not a traditional vested rights case and may
not have eliminated the requirement for further action in reliance upon the permit
in normal cases. But see R. RYAN, supra note 14, at § 8.2.3.
17. 299 Pa. at 160-61, 149 A. at 197.
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the landowner has notice of a pending or contemplated change in the appli-
cable law, he is not justified in taking action in reliance upon that law.
The "pending ordinance" doctrine developed as a natural corollary to
the vested rights theory.18 It is clear that in Pennsylvania a permit may be
denied if, on the date when the application is filed, there is an ordinance
"pending" that would, if adopted, require the denial of the permit. 19 In
the A. N. "Ab" Young Co. Zoning Case,20 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
recognized that the mere act of applying for a permit did not confer a
vested right even though the proposed use was in conformity with then
existing law.21 The application could be refused when an ordinance
pending at the time, if adopted, would forbid the proposed use; or, if a
permit had previously been granted but no further improvements or
expenditures had been made in reliance on the permit, it could be revoked
because of an ordinance enacted after the date of the application.22 Like-
wise, in A.I. Aberman, Inc. v. New Kensington,23 the supreme court
held that "a municipality may properly refuse a building permit for a land
use repugnant to a pending and later enacted zoning ordinance even though
application for the permit [was] made when the intended use [conformed]
to existing regulations .... -24 For purposes of the doctrine, an ordinance
is "pending" only after its proposal has been advertised according to law. 25
18. See generally, R. RYAN, supra note 14, at §§ 8.2.7-.8; Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d
596, 623-32 (1973).
19. See, e.g., Baron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 55, 275 A.2d 406
(1970).
20. 360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948).
21. Id. at 431-32, 61 A.2d at 840. But see note 16 supra. The plaintiff in Young,
who had previously built several double dwellings in disregard of the boundary lines
of the plotted lots, applied for a permit to construct another dwelling on part of a
lot which already had parts of other buildings on it. 360 Pa. at 430, 61 A.2d at 839.
The permit was at first granted and then revoked, but plaintiff did not appeal. Id.
No work had been undertaken in reliance upon the permit. Id. Soon thereafter, an
amendment to the zoning ordinance was proposed which provided that not more than
one building could be erected on a distinct numbered lot. Id. When plaintiff reapplied
for a permit, he was refused because of the pending amendment. Id. at 430, 61 A.2d
839-40. The court held that even though he filed before the effective date of the
new amendment, he had not yet acquired any vested right; thus, he was subject to
the new ordinance. Id. at 432, 61 A.2d at 840-44. See also Gold v. Building Comm.,
334 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d 367 (1939).
22. 360'Pa. at 431-32, 61 A.2d at 840.
23. 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954).
24. Id. at 527-28, 105 A.2d at 589-90. The zoning ordinance in Aberman had
been proposed by the city council, prepared by the planning commission, and discussed
in public hearings before an application for a permit was filed. Id. at 522-23, 105 A.2d
at 587. Compare Aberman with Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963),
where an amending ordinance was proposed and referred to the planning commission
for study, but neither public hearings were held nor public notice advertised before
plaintiff's building permit application. was filed. Id. at 511, 188 A.2d at 748. Under
such circumstances it was held that the ordinance was not legally "pending." Id.;
see Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 225-27, 328 A.2d 464, 466-67 (1974).
25. See Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 511, 188 A.2d 747, 748 (1963) ; Thorn-
bury Corp. v. Upper Uwchlan, 23 Chest. County Rep. 348 (1975). See also Casey v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 225-27, 328 A.2d 464, 466-67 (1974) (involving a
4
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The third concept of zoning law which contributed to the development
of special legislation was spot zoning - the arbitrary and unreasonable
classification and zoning of a small parcel of land which is usually set
apart or carved out of a surrounding or a larger neighboring tract.26 The
validity of spot zoning can be challenged on three grounds. First, most
zoning enabling statutes expressly require that zoning amendments be in
accordance with a comprehensive plan for orderly growth. For example,
the MPC grants to municipalities the general power to "enact, amend and
repeal zoning ordinances to implement comprehensive plans .... *27 Spot
zoning is not in accord with the comprehensive plan and thus is invalid. 28
Second, due process requires that for any zoning regulation to be valid,
it must bear a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals,
or welfare, 29 a criterion which spot zoning presumably does not meet.
Third, spot zoning is arguably a denial of the basic constitutional right of
equal protection under the laws because it involves the unequal treatment
of similarly situated properties without any rational basis for such a
distinction.
30
The spot zoning doctrine was first articulated in Pennsylvania in
Huebner v. Philadelphia Saving Fund Society,31 wherein the superior
court held that, in the absence of extenuating circumstances, the rezoning
of a single lot differently from those surrounding it was discriminatory and
invalid.32 A municipality may rezone a small piece of property for a use
different from that of surrounding uses if such use is in accord with the
comprehensive plan and is a reasonable use in the area.3 3  It may not,
rather unusual application of the pending ordinance doctrine in the context of a
developer-initiated exclusionary zoning challenge).
26. Schubach v. Silver, 461 Pa. 366, 380-87, 336 A.2d 328, 335-39 (1975)
Cleaver v. Board of Adj., 414 Pa. 367, 379, 200 A.2d 408, 415 (1964). See generally
8 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 25.83 (3d ed. 1965) ; 1 A. RATHKOPF,
THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 26-14 (3d ed. 1956); R. RYAN, supra note 14,
§§ 3.4.9-.12 (1970); Comment, "Spot Zoning" - A Vicious Practice or a Community
Benefit, 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 740 (1961); Note, Spot Zoning as Use Control, 13
HASTINGS L.J. 390 (1962).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10601 (Purdon 1972). For a statement of the
pre-MPC law in Pennsylvania, see Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 401 Pa. 211, 215, 164
A.2d 7, 9-10 (1960). See generally Haar, "In Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan,"
68 HARV. L. REV. 1154 (1955). See also Key Realty Co. Zoning Case, 408 Pa. 98,
100-01, 182 A.2d 187, 189 (1962) ; Comment, supra note 6, at 514.
28. See note 33 and accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 3 & 5 and accompanying text supra. This constitutional mandate
has been incorporated into section 604 of the MPC: "The provisions of zoning ordi-
nances shall be designed: (1) To promote, protect and facilitate one or more of the
following: the public health, safety, morals, general welfare .... " PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 10604 (Purdon 1972).
30. Cf. Cleaver v. Board of Adj., 414 Pa. 367, 200 A.2d 408 (1964) (reclassifica-
tion justified by the land's distinct characteristics).
31. 127 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 192 A. 139 (1937).
32. Id. at 38-39, 192 A.2d at 143.
33. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church v. City Council, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct.
222, 278 A.2d 372 (1971). Thus, it has been held that the natural extension of an
already existing district into an adjoining district might not constitute spot zoning.
Upper Darby Twp. Appeal, 413 Pa. 583, 198 A.2d 538 (1964).
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however, lawfully " 'create an "island" of more or less restricted use within
a district zoned for a different use or uses where there are no differentiating
relevant factors between the "island" and the district.' 34
These three concepts of basic zoning law collectively formed the
theoretical predicates for the doctrine of special legislation. While the
classic spot zoning case involved special treatment of a particular tract,
which usually benefited the owner, the case law recognized that the theory
was equally applicable when the special treatment worked to the economic
detriment of the landowner. 35 Discriminatory treatment of a particular
tract or an unwanted use could be attacked as spot zoning when the local
authorities could not defend it as being in accordance with their compre-
hensive plan.3 6 However, two factors made the spot zoning doctrine in-
adequate to protect fully landowners from discrimination. First, since the
doctrine was based upon disregard of the comprehensive plan and lack of
a substantial relationship to the general public welfare, it is submitted that
a municipality could prevent an otherwise lawful use by means of a rezon-
ing which could be supported as having some rational relation to the
public welfare and which still allowed some uses (other than that proposed
by the particular landowner) conforming to those already existing or per-
mitted in the neighborhood. Given the heavy burden of proving that the
amendment was discriminatory or bore no reasonable relationship to the
objectives of the comprehensive plan, 37 a landowner could find himself
facing an insurmountable burden. Second, because under the spot zoning
doctrine the rezoning applies only to the "spot" itself, which is treated
differently than neighboring property, a municipality could circumvent the
34. Cleaver v. Board of Adj., 414 Pa. 367, 379, 200 A.2d 408, 415 (1964), quoting
Putney v. Abington Twp., 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 463, 474, 108 A.2d 134, 140 (1954).
35. See Glorioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964) ; Putney v. Abington
Twp., 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 463, 474, 108 A.2d 134, 140 (1954). One authority has
commented:
[Spot zoning is the] practice whereby a single lot or area is granted privileges
which are not granted or extended to other land in the vicinity in the same use
district. It is also, but more rarely, used to describe the reverse proposition, that
is, one in which a single lot has burdens imposed upon it which are more rigid
than those imposed upon other properties within the same district.
A. RATHKOPF, supra note 26, at 26-1 (footnote omitted).
The Glorioso case was apparently the only time a landowner was successful
in applying the spot zoning doctrine to the less common situation mentioned by
Rathkopf. In Glorioso the challenger owned one of three parcels that were classified
in an especially restrictive zone completely surrounded by commercial zones and uses.
413 Pa. at 196, 196 A.2d 670. The special zone was struck down as spot zoning
because of the absence of any basis for the separate, more burdensome treatment.
Id. at 200, 196 A.2d at 672. Factually, Glorioso was very similar to a special legislation
case. Compare Glorioso with Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d
299 (1954). In fact, the landowner in Glorioso unsuccessfully based his challenge
upon an attack against the motives of the municipal officials. 413 Pa. at 196, 196 A.2d
at 670. See also Guentter v. Borough of Lansdale, 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 345 A.2d
306 (1975).
36. See, e.g., Glorioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 196 A.2d 668 (1964).
37. See notes 124-37 and accompanying text infra.
COMMENTS
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doctrine by rezoning an entire neighborhood, uniformly prohibiting a use
which most likely would have been practical only on the discriminated
owner's land. Such a circumvention was attempted in Lower Merion v.
Frankel.,38 where the landowner-developer wished to construct a high rise
apartment building to which neighbors were vehemently opposed. 39 On
the same day on which a preliminary permit was requested, a neighborhood
group petitioned the local legislative body to rezone the entire neighbor-
hood to a classification which forbade apartments. 40 An amendment was
proposed and enacted, the preliminary permit was revoked, and a final
permit was denied.41 In challenging this ruling, the developer argued that
the amendment was spot zoning and that action he had taken in reliance
upon the preliminary permit created a vested right to his proposed use.
4 2
At trial, he contended that the inclusion of other properties was a mere
device to screen the discriminatory nature of the ordinance, and that it
would have been impossible to build apartments on any of the other prop-
erties. The court, however, found that the alleged discriminatory purpose
was not as apparent as the developer contended.
4
3
Thus, if a permit could be obtained and acted upon before the intro-
duction of any zoning amendments, the landowner would be protected by
the vested rights doctrine against the inevitable rezoning proposals which
usually followed public knowledge of imminent development. However, if
municipal officials who objected to the proposed use were sufficiently alert,
the developer could expect minor technical and substantive objections to
delay the granting of a permit until amending ordinances had been intro-
duced and advertised.4 4 In order to protect the individual against the
arbitrary abuse of local legislative discretion, the doctrine of special legis-
lation, long a part of local government law, 45 was adopted to the field of
zoning.
III. THE SPECIAL LEGISLATION CASES
The seminal case applying the doctrine of special legislation to zoning
ordinances was Shapiro v. Zoning Board of Adjustment.4 6 Plaintiff in
38. 64 Montg. County L. Rep. 14 (1947), aff'd, 358 Pa. 430, 57 A.2d 900 (1948).
39. 64 Montg. County L. Rep. at 16.
40. Id. at 16-17.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 35. Other circumstances, though, led the court to find that the ordinance
was discriminatory and arbitrary, and that vested rights had arisen before the ordi-
nance was proposed. Id. at 31. On appeal, this finding was affirmed by the supreme
court. 358 Pa. 430, 57 A.2d 900 (1948).
44. The MPC now provides that once an application for land development or
subdivision plat approval is "duly filed" and pending, no change or amendment of
the zoning, land development and subdivision, or other governing ordinance shall
affect that application. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(4) (Purdon 1972).
45. See 2 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 26, at §§ 4.35, 4.47-.48; W. VALENTE, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 88-100 (1975); Winters, Classification of Municipalities, 57 Nw.
U.L. REV. 279 (1962).
46. 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954).
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Shapiro was the lessee of land located in an "A-Commercial" district, the
permitted uses of which included athletic and amusement parks. 47  On
March 18, 1953, plaintiff applied for use permits which would have enabled
him to establish a "kiddie amusement park" on his premises. 48 The appli-
cation was rejected on April 23, and on May 25, while plaintiff's appeal
of the rejection was pending, an amendment to the zoning ordinance was
proposed which would have prevented the establishment of amusement
parks in "A-Commercial" districts.40  Despite a lower court ruling, filed
on June 25, that plaintiff's use was permissible, the city council voted on
July 2 to enact the proposed amendment at its next session, scheduled
for July 23.50 The use permit was issued on July 10 in compliance with
the lower court's order, but plaintiff was warned that it would be revoked
if the pending amendment was adopted. 51 The city council adopted the
amendment on July 23, and plaintiff's permit was revoked on August 13.52
In deciding plaintiff's appeal of the revocation, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court agreed with the lower court that the amendment " 'was special legis-
lation, unjustly discriminatory, arbitrary, unreasonable, and confiscatory
in its application, in that it was aimed directly at this particular piece of
property . . . .,.3 It affirmed the holding that the amendment was in-
applicable to plaintiff's land and had no effect upon his rights to develop
because it constituted "special legislation directed at a particular individual
.... ,,54 Therefore, the pending ordinance doctrine did not apply, and the
action which plaintiff had undertaken in reliance upon the permit created
a vested right to his proposed use.55
In the next special legislation case decided by the supreme court,
Yocum v. Power,50 the developer would have been unsuccessful had the
pending ordinance doctrine alone been applicable. A church congregation
47. Id. at 623, 105 A.2d at 300.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 623-26, 105 A.2d at 300-01.
50. Id. at 625, 105 A.2d at 301.
51. Id. at 625-26, 105 A.2d at 301.
52. Id. at 626, 105 A.2d at 301.
53. Id. at 628, 105 A.2d at 302-03 (quoting lower court) (emphasis supplied by
the court).
54. ld. at 626, 105 A.2d at 302. That the amendment was aimed directly at
plaintiff was clearly shown by the language with which the council resolved on July
2 to enact the new ordinance: "'WHEREAS, There appears to be the possibility of
the establishment of such an amusement park immediately adjoining a residential
district in northwest Philadelphia . I...'" d  at 625, 105 A.2d at 301 (quoting lower
court).
55. Id. at 626, 105 A.2d at 302. Factually, Shapiro was a traditional vested
rights case. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra. Rather than base its
disposition of the case solely upon vested rights, however, the supreme court instead
chose to rest its holding upon both the vested rights doctrine and the special legislation
principle. See text accompanying notes 80-83 infra.
56. 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960).
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purchased land zoned "A-Residential," which allowed construction of new
churches. 57 At the behest of complaining neighbors, a bill was introduced
in city council on June 12, 1958, which would have reclassified the specific
tract involved to "AA-Residential," a zone which excluded new churches.5 8
The congregation received notice of the proposed amendment on August 4
when a public hearing was announced, and it quickly applied for and
received a zoning permit on August 13 and a building permit on August
18.r9 Correctly alleging that the amendment had been pending when appli-
cations had been made, the neighbors appealed the issuance of the permits.60
Because the church had taken no action which would give rise to vested
rights, it would have been subject to the pending ordinance, but the supreme
court held that the amendment was "special legislation which the Consti-
tution prohibits" 61 and affirmed dismissal of the neighbors' appeal.
The leading Pennsylvania Supreme Court case on special legislation,
Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel,62 also involved a pending ordi-
nance which might otherwise have frustrated the developer's plans. The
plaintiff in Peternel was the construction agent of a optionee which had
a contingent sales contract for ten acres of land in a "Neighborhood Shop-
ping (NS)" zone, which permitted shopping centers.6 a In April 1963 an
officer of plaintiff met with the township manager to determine the neces-
sary procedure to be followed in order to erect a shopping center.64 A
preliminary plot plan was filed on April 23, but five objections were raised
to it.65 Plaintiff remedied those objections, but at each of several subse-
quent meetings new objections were raised. On June 25 the Planning
Commission voted to deny plot plan approval. 66 On July 8 a proposed
amendment was introduced to the Board of Commissioners to change the
zoning from "NS" to "R-1 Residential," which would have prohibited
the shopping center. 67 Later in July the township engineer approved plain-
tiff's revised plot plan as being in "technical compliance" with the require-
ments of the original ordinance, but a formal application for a grading
permit, filed on August 7, 1963, was denied because it was not in triplicate,




61. Id. at 227, 157 A.2d at 370. Apparently, the amendment would have rezoned
only the property owned by the church, so that it was clearly "'aimed directly at this
particular piece of property.'" Id. at 229, 157 A.2d at 371 (quoting lower court).
This language is identical to that in Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 628,
105 A.2d 299, 303 (1954), which was relied upon as a "wholesome precedent" standing
"as a beacon light to guide the decision in the case at hand." Yocum v. Power, 398
Pa. at 228, 157 A.2d at 371.
62. 418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 514 (1965).
63. Id. at 306, 211 A.2d at 516.
64. Id. at 307, 211 A.2d at 516.
65. Id. at 308, 211 A.2d at 517.
66. Id. at 307-08, 211 A.2d at 516-17.
67. Id. at 307, 211 A.2d at 516.
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was not prepared by a registered engineer, and had no specifications at-
tached.68 Soon thereafter, in a move subsequently held to be aimed directly
at plaintiff, the grading ordinance was amended to make the securing of
a building permit a prerequisite to obtaining a grading permit.69 On both
August 30 and September 20 grading permits were denied, even though
plaintiff was in "technical compliance," because no building permit had
been secured and because of the pending zoning amendment. 70
Upon plaintiff's suit for mandamus, the trial court directed that both
the grading permit and the building permit issue.71 This order was affirmed
by the supreme court, which noted that even though plaintiff's orginal
application had been denied before the amendment was proposed, and
even though the amendment had been pending when the revised plot plan
was submitted, the pending ordinance doctrine presupposed a valid pending
ordinance.72 However, the "sole purpose" of the proposed amendment in
Peternel was to prevent plaintiff from constructing its project.73 The court
stressed that despite plaintiff's legal right to build the shopping center,
"at each step of the way [it was] met with obstructionism and hastily
erected barriers. As [plaintiff] overcame each objection or complied with
each request, township officials were busily erecting new barriers. '74 The
amendment was therefore held to be special legislation and inapplicable to
the plaintiff.
75
The most recent supreme court case which can be interpreted as
involving special legislation was Gallagher v. Building Inspector.76 Plaintiff
in Gallagher obtained building permits to construct townhouses in a zone
suitable for that use.77 After neighbors protested, the permits were sus-
pended; thereafter, an amendment was proposed and adopted which re-
zoned a six-block area, including plaintiff's land, from "B" to "A," which
prohibited townhouses. 78 The permits were then revoked pursuant to the
new zoning regulation. On appeal, however, the supreme court mandated
their reissuance.
79
68. Id. at 308, 211 A.2d at 517.
69. Id.
70. Id. The amendment was not finally enacted until June 8, 1964. Id. at 307, 211
A.2d at 516.
71. Id. at 309, 211 A.2d at 517.
72. Id. at 310, 211 A.2d at 518.
73. Id. at 311, 211 A.2d at 518. Although the court found that discrimination
against the developer was the "sole purpose" of the proposed amendment, id., "sole
purpose" has never been specifically held by the court to be the test for special legis-
lation. See text accompanying notes 124-33 infra.
74. 418 Pa. at 312, 211 A.2d at 519.
75. Id. at 313, 211 A.2d at 519. Peternel, it is submitted, illustrates the impedi-
ments which can be placed in front of a developer of a lawful but unpopular use by
local officials who are opposed to such a use in their community.
76. 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968).
77. Id. at 302, 247 A.2d at 572.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 305, 247 A.2d at 574.
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Gallagher may be classified as a special legislation case because of its
factual situation and because the supreme court based its decision, in part,
upon Shapiro and Yocum. 8 0 The decision, however, was based equally
upon a finding that vested rights had arisen.8l Therefore, while Gallagher
has been interpreted as a vested rights case,8 2 it is submitted that, like
Shapiro, it actually combined the vested rights doctrine with the special
legislation doctrine for the purposes of adjudication.8 3
Gallagher was the last special legislation case decided by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court. On January 1, 1970, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania was established and was delegated primary appellate juris-
diction in land use cases.8 4 Shortly thereafter, another alleged abuse of
local legislative power brought the doctrine of special legislation before
the commonwealth court in Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zoning Board
of Adjustment. 5 Plaintiff in Limekiln had the right to use and an option
to buy a tract of land in the "AA" residential zone, which permitted golf
courses as a special exception. 6 An exception was applied for in November
1968, but the public hearing on the proposal, held in December, was con-
tinued because the proposal was "'somewhat indefinite.' "87 At the con-
tinued hearing on January 13, 1969, the zoning hearing board erroneously
contended that the applicant had no right to the exception because it was
not the equitable owner,88 and it convinced plaintiff to withdraw its appli-
cation until it had exercised its option.89 On the following night the
supervisors proposed a zoning amendment which would have deleted golf
courses in "AA," "A," and "B" districts; the new ordinance was prepared
and advertised within days.90 Meanwhile, plaintiff exercised its option on
January 27 and reapplied for the exception on February 4.91 On that
afternoon plaintiff's representative was told that the application would be
acceptable even though not "notarized. '0 2 However, the amending ordi-
nance was adopted the same evening, and a few days later plaintiff re-
80. The court noted that the "instant case is quite similar to Shapiro.
Id. at 304, 247 A.2d at 574.
81. Id. at 304-05, 247 A.2d at 573-74.
82. See R. RYAN, supra note 14, at § 8.2.3. See also note 16 supra.
83. See note 55 supra.
84. The commonwealth court was established pursuant to the revised article V,
section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, approved April 23, 1968, by the voters
of the commonwealth. See PA. CONST. art. V, § 4. The constitutional revision was
implemented by the Commonwealth Court Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 211.1-.15
(Purdon Supp. 1976). The new court began hearing cases in September 1970.
85. 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 499, 275 A.2d 896 (1971).
86. Id. at 501-02, 275 A.2d at 898.
87. Id. at 503, 275 A.2d at 899 (quoting the record).
88. This advice was erroneous because Limekiln, which had the right to use the
land for five years, had standing to make the application. See 1 Pa. Commw. Ct.
at 503 n.1, 275 A.2d at 899 n.1.
89. Id. at 503, 275 A.2d at 899.
90. Id. at 504-05, 275 A.2d at 900.
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ceived its application in the mail with a request that it be notarized.93 The
application was refiled on February 11 but thereafter denied by the zoning
hearing board because it had not been "received" until after the amending
ordinance had become effective.
9 4
Even though the amendment applied to three whole zones and plain-
tiff's land was only a part of one zone, the commonwealth court found it
could have had "no conceivable purpose except to prohibit the use Limekiln
proposed. 9 5 The court discussed the supreme court's rulings in special
legislation cases and held them determinative of the case at bar.96 Noting
that each of the township's objections was based upon minor details, the
court stated that the pattern of behavior of the officials involved revealed
that the ordinance was "tailored" to Limekiln for the "special purpose" of
preventing its use.97 It was thus held to be special legislation and ineffective
as to plaintiff's land.98
Limekiln was followed soon thereafter by Linda Development Corp. v.
Plymouth Township.99 In September 1969, the defendant township rezoned
the "A-Residential" district in which plaintiff's land was situated to "High-
Rise Apartment." 10 0 Neighbors immediately appealed the change in two
separate actions. 10 ' While these appeals were pending, plaintiff attempted
to secure a building permit for development of a high rise apartment
building.10 2 In December 1969, its application was denied because of the
pending suits and plaintiff's failure to supply certain data which the
township contended was required. 103 On January 8, 1970, the Board of
Commissions set a zoning hearing to consider another amendement which
would have rezoned only plaintiff's individual tract back to "A-Residen-
tial. °10 4 On January 21, another building permit application was rejected
because of the pending ordinance and plaintiff's failure to supply complete
drainage plans. 10 Plaintiff thereafter appealed from this denial. On August
5, 1970, plaintiff filed preliminary objections to the two suits brought in
September 1969 by neighbors appealing the first rezoning. 10 6 Appeals were
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 509, 275 A.2d at 902.
96. Id. at 507-09, 275 A.2d at 901-02.
97. Id. at 509-10, 275 A.2d at 902.
98. Id. at 510, 275 A.2d at 902-03. The court also held that the zoning hearing
board had committed an error of law by refusing the admission of certain evidence
offered for the purpose of proving special legislation. Id. at 511, 275 A.2d at 903;
see notes 136-38 and accompanying text infra.
99. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 334, 281 A.2d 784 (1971).
100. Id. at 336, 281 A.2d at 785-86.
101. Id., 281 A.2d 786.
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also taken from the separate dismissals of those preliminary objections,
and plaintiff's three appeals were then consolidated for disposition by the
commonwealth court.
107
In a complex and difficult opinion, the commonwealth court held,
first, that plaintiff's orginal application should not have been rejected on
the basis of the neighbors' pending suits, and that under the then effective
"High-Rise Apartment" zone plaintiff had a clear legal right to that use.' 08
It then held that the new rezoning back to "A-Residential" was uncon-
stitutional as applied to plaintiff and inapplicable to its land because it
was special legislation.100 The court found that there could be no doubt
that the "sole purpose" 110 of the second rezoning was to prevent plaintiff's
lawful use of its tract."'
Linda Development was the last appellate case in which a developer
successfully alleged the special legislation doctrine." 2 By the time it was
decided in 1971, the elements necessary for invocation of the doctrine had
been conclusively determined: a zoning ordinance aimed directly at a
particular piece of property to prevent its use for a theretofore legal pur-
pose would be characterized as special legislation and held inapplicable to
that particular piece of property." 3  The absence of appellate level cases
since Linda, however, does not mean that municipal officials have stopped
discriminating against particular developers or projects. Rather, it is sub-
mitted that these officials had, by 1971, become aware of the growth of
the doctrine, and that they have since developed more sophisticated means
of disguising their discriminatory purposes. At the same time, several
practical problems have arisen which make it difficult for landowners'
counsel to invoke the special legislation principle against discriminatory
actions. These problems, which will now be discussed, derive from the
language of the special legislation cases and the Pennsylvania zoning appeals
procedure.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 338, 281 A.2d at 786. The court held that the lower court should have
sustained plaintiff's preliminary objections to the neighbors' suits, and that therefore
those pending suits could not form the basis for a denial of the permits in the instant
case. Id. The court further stated that it was not deciding the issue of whether pending
suits generally could be a valid basis for denying a permit. Id. at 338 n.1, 281 A.2d
at 786 n.1.
109. Id. at 338, 281 A.2d at 786, citing Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel,
418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 514 (1965).
110. See notes 124-33 and accompanying text infra.
111. 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 340, 281 A.2d at 787. A dissenting opinion by one
member of the court addressed only the court's further holdings on the preliminary
objections appeals. Id. at 347, 281 A.2d at 791 (Mercer, J., dissenting).
112. Cf. Clover Hill Farms, Inc. v. Lehigh Twp., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 239, 289
A.2d 778 (1972) (zoning ordinance was not invalid as special legislation).
113. In special legislation cases, the facial validity of the amending ordinance is
not in question. Since the challenge is to the constitutionality of the rezoning as it
applies to plaintiff, a holding of special legislation invalidates only the application of
the amendment to plaintiff's particular land, not its general prospective application.
See, e.g., Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 629, 105 A.2d 299, 303 (1954).
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IV. JUDICIAL LANGUAGE AND BURDENS OF PROOF: SOME
IMPEDIMENTS TO SPECIAL LEGISLATION CHALLENGES
The major problems of the special legislation doctrine concern the
element of proof.11 4 To attack successfully a rezoning as a special legis-
lation, a landowner must prove that the amendment was "aimed directly at
[his] particular piece of property"' 15 to prevent his proposed lawful use
of the land. Unlike certain other types of zoning litigation, the burden of
proof in a special legislation case does not shift to the defendant after the
plaintiff has shown certain preliminary facts.116 The developer is also
subject to a more important practical burden because the "proof" is in the
hands - and minds - of the defendant municipal officials." 7 This is
especially burdensome because under the MPC the developer must build
his record before the zoning hearing board." 8 The MPC, however, does
not provide for discovery procedures at the zoning hearing board level.
This omission and the language of some of the special legislation cases
have fostered significant practical problems for landowners with special
legislation claims.
114. In general, since the ultimate power to enact zoning ordinances is vested in
the local governing body, its good faith in acting for the public welfare is not scru-
tinized by the courts. Gratton v. Conte, 364 Pa. 578, 583, 73 A.2d 381, 384 (1950).
Pennsylvania courts do not consider it their function to substitute their discretion for
that of the local legislative body, "except where that body has manifestly abused its
powers by arbitrary or confiscatory actions." Silver v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 381 Pa. 41,
45, 112 A.2d 84, 87 (1955). It is undisputed that a zoning ordinance "is presumed to
be valid and Constitutional and [that] the burden of proving otherwise is upon [the
challenger]." Cleaver v. Board of Adj., 414 Pa. 367, 373, 200 A.2d 408, 412 (1964),
citing DiSanto v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 410 Pa. 331, 189 A,2d 135 (1963). Before
a zoning ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, the challenger must prove that
"its provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. If the validity of the legislative
judgment is fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control . .. ."
Glorioso Appeal, 413 Pa. 194, 198, 196 A.2d 668, 671 (1964), citing Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj.,
425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967); Best v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 393 Pa. 106, 141 A.2d
606 (1958) ; Kaiserman v. Springfield Twp., 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 287, 348 A.2d 467
(1975) ; Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 404, 333 A.2d 239 (1975).
115. Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 628, 105 A.2d 299, 303 (1954)
(by implication) (emphasis deleted).
116. In the usual zoning challenge, the plaintiff has the burden of proof through-
out. See note 114 supra. Different rules, however, govern total prohibition and exclu-
sionary zoning cases. See, e.g., Beaver Gas Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571,
285 A.2d 501 (1971), which held that once the developer proves a total prohibition
of an otherwise lawful use, the burden of proof shifts to the municipality to prove
that the prohibition bears a relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare. Id.
at 576, 285 A.2d at 504 (1971). See also Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d
765 (1970), an exclusionary zoning case which placed the burden upon the municipality
to prove an "extraordinary justification" for two- or three-acre minimum lot sizes. Id.
at 471, 268 A.2d at 767. No court has yet adapted the "shifting burden" approach to
a special legislation case. See note 138 infra.
117. See notes 136-38 and accompanying text infra.
118. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10910 (Purdon 1972).
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A. Size of the Rezoning
Related to the practical problems of proving specific intent on the part
of municipal officials to discriminate against a particular parcel1 19 is the
issue of whether a municipality can circumvent the special legislation doc-
trine by rezoning a tract of land larger than that owned by plaintiff.
120
This question arose because of certain language in the Peternel decision
which was later quoted in the Linda Development case.
In Peternel, the township had contended that the proposed rezoning
was unlike spot zoning because it involved a large area - plaintiff's ten-
acre tract.1 2' The court noted, however, that the size of the rezoning was
irrelevant, and that regardless of the size of the area affected, a rezoning
would still be invalid so long as it was aimed at preventing a theretofore
legal use "of an integrated unit owned by one common interest .... -122
This language suggested two possible interpretations. It was arguable
that after Peternel a municipality could not disguise discrimination against
a particular parcel by rezoning it and several neighboring parcels - for
example, discriminating against a particular one-half acre plot by rezoning
its whole fifty-acre neighborhood. A more limited interpretation, however,
would be that the words "of an integrated unit owned by one common
interest" were meant to limit the special legislation doctrine to rezonings
of only a single parcel, whether that parcel was a one-half acre lot or a
fifty-acre tract.
Because both Peternel and Linda Development involved amendments
which rezoned only the land owned by the plaintiffs in those cases, they
Would seem to be consistent with the second, more limiting interpretation;
yet, because they involved rezonings of only one parcel, the issue of whether
a rezoning of several parcels owned by different landowners could also
be held to be special legislation directed against one of those parcels did
not arise. The issue did arise, however, in Limekiln, and was settled by
implication. In Limekiln, plaintiff's parcel was only a part of the "AA"
residential district, and the zoning amendment eliminated his proposed
use from all of the "AA," "A," and "B" residential zones. 123 Therefore, the
holding of Limekiln that the rezoning was special legislation clearly settled
by implication the issue of whether the special legislation doctrine could
be applied to rezonings of more than one parcel.
119. See notes 136-58 and accompanying text infra.
120. Stated otherwise, the issue is whether the municipality can circumvent the
doctrine by denying a use in an entire neighborhood which, practically speaking, only
one person could have used. A related issue, beyond the scope of this discussion, is
whether special legislation could be used in the same manner as spot zoning to chal-
lenge a rezoning which favors an individual by allowing a use throughout a district
which would benefit only that single individual.
121. 418 Pa. at 312, 211 A.2d at 519.
122. Id. This language was thereafter quoted without discussion by the common-
wealth court in Linda Dev. Corp. v. Plymouth Twp., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 334, 339,
281 A.2d 784, 787 (1971).
123. 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. at 509, 275 A.2d at 902.
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B. "Sole PUrpose"
Since Peternel, the special legislation cases have almost unanimously
adopted the supreme court's language in that case that the rezoning was
" 'for the sole purpose of preventing the legal use by plaintiffs of their
property.' 124 Even though no court has ever expressly held that in order
to prevail in a special legislation case the landowner must prove that the
"sole purpose" of the amendment was to prevent his proposed use, there
is a possibility that the survival of this language could lead to problems
for developers. For example, in Clover Hill Farms, Inc. v. Lehigh Town-
ship,125 the commonwealth court held that the landowner failed to prove
that the ordinance involved "was specifically directed against its property,
or was meant in any manner to be discriminatory.' 26 However, a head-
note in the official report of that case stated: "Zoning ordinances are not
invalid as special legislation of a discriminatory nature unless such are
enacted for the sole purpose of preventing the otherwise lawful use of
land by its owner.' 2
7
It is submitted that "sole purpose" is not, and never has been, the
test of special legislation, and that careless use of the "sole purpose"
language should therefore be avoided. In several of the cases it was clear
that discrimination was the sole purpose for the rezonings involved. 28
In several others, where there apparently could have been other legitimate
reasons advanced to support the rezonings, not all of the courts have found
a discriminatory sole purpose. 129 Thus, several cases have held that prov-
ing that discrimination was the "sole purpose" was sufficient,"30 but none
has held that such proof was necessary. The distinction is important be-
cause municipal officials are vested with legislative discretion in the adoption
of zoning ordinances, and courts are generally unwilling to substitute their
judgment for that of the officials.'13  Since local officials can cite innumer-
able reasons to shbw a rational relationship between nearly any zoning
ordinance and the public health, safety, or welfare,13 2 landowners alleging
124. 418 Pa. at 311, 211 A.2d at 518 (1965) (quoting lower court).
125. 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 239, 289 A.2d 778 (1972).
126. Id. at 242, 289 A.2d at 780.
127. Id. at 239. The "official" headnotes are used only in the official reporter and
do not appear in the West Atlantic Second Reporter.
128. See Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 311, 211 A.2d 514,
518 (1965); Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 628-29, 105 A.2d 299, 303
(1954); Linda Dev. Corp. v. Plymouth Twp., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 334, 340, 281
A.2d 784, 787 (1971).
129. But see Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 1 Pa. Commw. Ct.
499, 275 A.2d 896 (1971), wherein the court noted that the amendment there could have
had "no conceivable purpose except to prohibit the use Limekiln proposed." Id. at 509,
275 A.2d at 902.
130. See, e.g., Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 311, 211
A.2d 514, 518 (1965).
131. See note 114 supra.
132. See, e.g., National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa.
504, 527, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (1965).
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special legislation would be faced with an almost insurmountable burden
if required to prove that preventing their particular use was the sole pur-
pose for an ordinance. This is especially so when the burden is considered
in light of the problems involved in proving discriminatory motive.1
33
It is submitted that the cases provide a more workable test than
"sole purpose" in their requirement that the landowner prove that the
ordinance was "aimed directly at [his] particular piece of property" to
prevent a theretofore lawful use of his land. 3 4 Such a test is flexible
enough to function in an area of the law where some legitimate reasons
can always be advanced to support the rationality of an exercise of discre-
tion. Even though a rezoning may rationally be supported by legitimate
reasons, if it would not have been enacted but for its anticipated effect of
preventing the otherwise lawful use of property by a particular landowner,
then such a rezoning should be struck down as special legislation. While
such a test has been implicitly adopted by all of the special legislation
cases, 135 it is submitted that the courts should expressly articulate the
standard to prevent further confusion.
C. Proof in the Hands of Defendant
The fact that a plaintiff alleging special legislation must in effect prove
the state of mind of local legislators places a very difficult burden upon a
landowner. Since local officials will probably not admit to conspiring pur-
posely against a plaintiff, this burden culminates in the landowner's at-
tempting to prove by way of inferences that certain behavior was un-
doubtedly caused by certain unlawful motives. Furthermore, most of the
information needed to prove these motives is held by the defendant, so
that even plaintiff's preliminary investigation may be hindered by the fact
that only the defendant officials know what records, telephone calls, and
conversations, recorded and unrecorded, bear witness to the true purposes
for their actions. Other areas of zoning litigation, such as the total pro-
hibition cases' and the large lot exclusionary zoning and tokenism de-
133. See notes 136-58 and accompanying text infra.
134. Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 628, 105 A.2d 299, 303 (1954)
(quoting lower court).
135. See Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 311, 211 A.2d
514, 518 (1965); Linda Dev. Co. v. Plymouth Twp., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 334, 340,
281 A.2d 784, 787 (1971) ; Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 1 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 499, 508, 275 A.2d 896, 902 (1971).
136. In numerous cases the attempt to prohibit totally what were otherwise lawful
uses of land has been held unconstitutional. See, e.g., Beaver Gas Co. v. Osborne
Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 285 A.2d 501 (1971) (gasoline stations); Girsh Appeal, 437
Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (apartments) ; Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Bd.
of Adj., 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169 (1967) (quarries) ; Ammon R. Smith Auto Co.
Appeal, 423 Pa. 493, 223 A.2d 683 (1966) (flashing signs) ; Norate Corp. v. Zoning
Bd. of Adj., 417 Pa. 397, 207 A.2d 890 (1965) (billboards) ; East Pikeland Twp. v.
Bush Bros., Inc., 13 Pa. Commw. Ct. 578, 319 A.2d 701 (1974) (mobile homes).
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cisions,13 7 have developed a shifting burden of proof 6oncept which greatly
benefits landowners.' 88 However, there is nothing a landowner can do to
raise a presumption of special legislation and shift the burden of proof
onto the municipality.139 A shifting burden test would make the doctrine
a much more practical tool for combatting discrimination.
D. No Discovery
Another major impediment to the plaintiff landowner in a special
legislation case is the lack of discovery provisions in the MPC. The MPC
sets up an elaborate scheme of procedure for challenging the constitution-
ality of a zoning ordinance. 140 Landowners are given two methods by
which to contest the substantive validity of an ordinance. They may go to
the zoning hearing board (board) for a "report" on the validity of the
ordinance,141 or they may go to the governing body with a request for a
"curative amendment.' 42 As a practical matter, however, many landowner
appeals end up before the board' 43 which is required to take evidence, to
make a record, to make findings of fact, and to decide all contested ques-
137. See Willistown Twp. v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa. 445, 341 A.2d 466
(1975); Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); National Land & Inv.
Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). These cases
involved zoning ordinances which were held to have -either the intent or effect of
limiting the growth of the municipalities involved and excluding outsiders who wanted
to migrate into the municipalities but could not do so because of the effects of the
zoning.
Numerous treatises and articles have been written on the topic of exclusionary
zoning during recent years. For some of the better discussions, see R. BABCOCK, THE
ZONING GAME (1966); R. BABCOCK & F. BOSSELMAN, ExCLUSIONARY ZONING: LAND
USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 
1970's (1973); D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING
DILEMMA: A LEGAL STRATEGY FOR URBAN CHANGE (1971); SUBURBAN ACTION
INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF ExcLuSION (1973); Babcock & Bosselman, Suburban Zoning
and the Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040 (1963); Bigham & Bostick
Exclusionary Zoning Practices: An Examination of the Current Controversy, 25
VAND. L. REV. 111 (1972); Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767 (1969) ; Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645 (1971).
138. See note 116 supra. The total prohibition cases developed the rule that when
an individual challenging a zoning ordinance proves a total prohibition of an other-
wise lawful use, the burden shifts to the municipality to prove that the prohibition
bears a relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare. See, e.g., Beaver Gas
Co. v. Osborne Borough, 445 Pa. 571, 576, 285 A.2d 501, 504 (1971).
The exclusionary zoning cases may be read as supporting the proposition
that absent some compelling governmental interest, a zoning ordinance which excludes
outsiders will be held unconstitutional. For example, in Concord Twp. Appeal, 439
Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970), the supreme court stated that absent some "extraordinary
justification" two- or three-acre minimum lot size requirements are unreasonable. Id.
at 471, 268 A.2d at 767; see Willistown Twp. v. Chesterdale Farms, Inc., 462 Pa.
445, 449, 341 A.2d 466, 468 (1975), quoting with approval Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 808 (1975). See also 1 SUBURBAN ACTION INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF EXCLU-
SION 52 (1973) ; Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land Use Controls: The Case
of Northeastern New Jersey, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 475, 543, 569 (1971).
139. See note 116 supra.
140. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 11001-11011 (Purdon 1972).
141. Id. § 11004(1) (a).
142. Id. § 11004(1) (b). But see text accompanying notes 159-76 infra.
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tions, factual or substantive.1 44 In hearings before the board, the parties
may be represented by counsel, may offer evidence, and may cross-examine
adverse witnesses.145 Formal rules of evidence do not apply.146 The
board is empowered to administer oaths and to issue subpoenas, including
subpoenas duces tecum to compel the production of relevant documents
and papers. 147 However, there is no provision for prior discovery of any
kind.' 48 As a practical result of this procedure, plaintiff is severely hindered
in making its record because pre-litigation investigation has been hindered
and because plaintiff is never certain what evidence will be available at the
hearing. Besides the difficulty of preparing for the hearings, the inability
of counsel to discover records before hearings and to depose municipal
officials makes it difficult for the plaintiff to induce admissions or other
suggestions of unlawful motive from the officials, who can otherwise be
quite rehearsed in their testimony by the time they testify at the hearing.
In addition, under the current law, the developer must put these officials
on the witness stand and ask them questions about the rezoning while
having no idea of how they will respond.
49
After determination -by the board, substantive challenges can be ap-
pealed to the court of common pleas, 150 which issues a writ of certiorari
143. Even if a request for a curative amendment under section 11004(1)(b) is
denied, the landowner may begin a new challenge before the board. PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 53, § 11004(3) (Purdoh 1972). The governing body's decision may also be
appealed directly to a court. Id.
144. Id. § 10910. Provisions relating to the board are covered in article 9 of the
MPC. See id. §§ 10901-10916.
145. Id. § 10908(5).
146. Id. § 10908(6).
147. Id. § 10908(4). The subpoena power is often ineffective, however, because
the board lacks the effective power to enforce its orders and is often unwilling to do so
in the face of apathy by subpoenaed witnesses.
148. It is instructive to compare the discovery provision or lack thereof in other
kinds of administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings. The Pennsylvania Eminent
Domain Code (EDC), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 1-101 to -903 (Spec. Pamphlet 1976),
empowers the courts of common pleas to issue subpoenas for attendance at viewer's
hearings. Id. § 1-510. However, it has been held that this subpoena provision does
not authorize discovery before Board of Viewer's proceedings but only after appeal
to the court of common pleas. Wilkinsburg Viewers, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 77 (C.P.
Allegheny County 1970). The Rules of Civil Procedure for Justices of the Peace,
adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on October 15, 1969, in an effort to
expedite proceedings and minimize costs, do not allow discovery before justice of
the peace proceedings. PA. R.J.P. 325. Likewise, there is no discovery in habeas
corpus proceedings, Commonwealth ex Iel. Pollard v. Robinson, 42 Pa. D. & C.2d
703 (C.P. Allegheny County 1967), nor in Orphan's courts. Mackarus Estate, 431 Pa.
585, 246 A.2d 661 (1968). Discovery is allowed in child custody proceedings, Com-
monwealth ex rel. Triola v. Triola, 41 Pa. D. & C.2d 236 (C.P. Monroe County
1966), as well as in certain due process hearings involving nonrenewal and termination
of nontenured college and university faculty. See 5 Pa. Bull. 718 (1975).
149. A further problem with regard to board procedures, but one which lies
beyond the scope of this Comment, is the applicability of an attorney-client privilege
to dealings between public officials and municipal solicitors. In the context of the
instant discussion, the question is whether records of meetings, discussions, or advice
involving public officials and solicitors about actions later challenged as special legis-
lation are privileged or can be discovered and admitted into evidence.
150. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53,§ 11004(3) (Purdon 1972).
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commanding the board to certify to the court the entire record, including
the transcript of testimony before the board.' 51 While the court has discre-
tion to hold a hearing to receive additional evidence or to remand the case to
the board to receive additional evidence, 5 2 this procedure is rarely em-
ployed. 15 3 When no additional testimony is taken by the court, the findings
of the board will not be overturned if supported by substantial evidence or
unless the board clearly abused its discretion.15
4
It is submitted that the lack of discovery prior to board proceedings,
coupled with the courts' usual practice of not hearing zoning appeals de
novo, increases the developer's difficulty in sustaining his burden of proof
in special legislation cases. As one authority has stated: "One of the
underlying purposes of the Discovery Rules is to prevent a party who has
a justifiable claim from being penalized because the facts necessary to prove
the claim are in the possession of his adversary."'15 5 In effect, making the
challenging landowner prove the hidden motives of those possessing the
evidence of those motives without the assistance of discovery procedures
gives the defendant municipal officials an unjust advantage and denies
aggrieved landowners ready access to the doctrine of special legislation.
The lack of discovery provisions in the MPC is probably a significant
factor in the decrease of special legislation challenges in recent years. Only
a courageous landowner would risk withholding his proof of special legis-
lation at the zoning hearing board level in the hope that, on appeal from
an adverse decision, the court would later allow him discovery and the
opportunity to present his evidence. The discovery provisions of the Penn-
sylvania Rules of Civil Procedure' 56 currently provide for discovery only
in actions brought in any "court" which is subject to the Rules."5T Only
if the court allowed the presentation of additional evidence would the
landowner benefit from the opportunity to seek discovery at the common
151. Id. § 11008(2).
152. Id. § 11010.
153. Even though the courts may take additional evidence, they are not required
to and usually will not do so. See Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation and the New
Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1029, 1073, 1086, 1099 (1972). One
commentator has suggested, by way of explanation, that most courts fear they would
be swamped with requests for the very evidentiary hearings which the board proce-
dures were designed to prevent. Ryan, Zoning - Recent Developments in Pennsyl-
vania Zoning Laws, Problems of the Land Developer; Challenging Local Ordinances,
in SELECTED REAL ESTATE Topics 38-1,-8 (Pa. Bar Inst. Pub. 'No. 58, 1975).
154. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11010 (Purdon 1972); see Saint Vladimir's
Ukranian Orthodox Church v. Fun Bun, Inc., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 394, 398, 283 A.2d
308, 310 (1971) ; Clemens v. Upper Gwynedd Twp. Zoning Bd., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 71,
75, 281 A.2d 93, 96 (1971). See also Wynnewood Civic Ass'n v. Lower Merion Twp.
Bd. of Adj., 406 Pa. 413, 419, 179 A.2d 649, 652-53 (1962).
155. 5 STANDARD PA. PRAC. ch. 20, § 2 (1958) (footnotes omitted). Further, one
of the purposes for the procedure in which the board rather than a court makes the
record is to expedite zoning appeals. However, if counsel do not obtain defendant's
materials until the hearing, continuances and delays occur while counsel sift through
all the papers, follow up leads, and prepare plaintiff's presentation.
156. PA. R. Civ. P. 4001-4025.
157. Id. 4001.
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pleas level. Since he is- required to make his record before the board,
later discovery is practically useless. Thus, the lack of discovery pro-
cedures prior to the board stage is a deficiency in the MPC procedure
which should be remedied by legislative amendment of either the MPC
or the Rules of Civil Procedure. One possibility would be the recognition
that board proceedings are, in effect, quasi-judicial factfinding proceedings
and that, therefore, the statutory definition of "court" 15 should be amended
to include the boards. Another possibility would be a specific amendment
to the MPC to provide for discovery.
E. Route of Appeal
Prior to the adoption of the MPC, a landowner with a special legis-
lation case could appeal the denial or revocation of a building permit either
through the zoning board of adjustment process' 50 or by going directly to
court with an action in mandamus. 160 By proceeding in mandamus, the
landowner commenced his challenge directly in the courts instead of before
the municipality's own zoning board, which enabled him, if he desired, to
seek discovery at the very beginning of his challenge and before being
required to present his witnesses.' 8 '
However, the adoption of the MPC has created serious doubt as to
the continued viability of the mandamus route. Although it would appear
that the MPC gives the landowner the choice of proceeding in mandamus,
with the right to seek discovery, 62 or proceeding before the zoning hear-
ing board or the governing body using the appeal process authorized by
article X of the MPC,163 without the right to seek discovery, it is submitted
158. See note 157 and accompanying text supra.
159. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of Adj., 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954).
160. See, e.g., Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d
514 (1965). Mandamus is an extraordinary writ which compels the performance of
a ministerial act by the defendant whose duty it is to perform that act. Veratti v.
Ridley Twp., 416 Pa. 242, 248, 206 A.2d 13, 14 (1965); Travis v. Teter, 370 Pa.
326, 330-31, 87 A.2d 177, 179 (1952). It can issue, however, only when the plaintiff
has a "clear legal right" to the performance of the act, such as the issuance of a
building permit. Veratti v. Ridley Twp., 416 Pa. 242, 246, 206 A.2d 13, 14 (1965);
Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 514, 188 A.2d 747, 749-50 (1963). It will not lie to
control the exercise of official discretion, but it will issue to compel the exercise
of discretion or to prevent the arbitrary or fraudulent exercise of discretion. Gar-
ratt v. Philadelphia, 387 Pa. 442, 448, 127 A.2d 738, 741 (1956) ; Maxwell v. Farrell
School Dist. Bd. of Directors, 381 Pa. 561, 566-67, 112 A.2d 192, 195 (1955). In
Pennsylvania, mandamus actions are governed by rules 1091-1099 of the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure. PA. R. Civ. P. 1091-1099.
161. See text accompanying notes 136-58 supra.
162. Section 909 of the MPC provides: "Nothing contained herein shall be con-
strued to deny to the appellant the right to proceed directly in court, where appropriate,
pursuant to Pa. R. Civ. P., sections 1091 to 1098 relating to mandamus." PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10909 (Purdon 1972).
163. Section 1004 of the MPC, id. § 11004, offers two methods by which a land-
owner may challenge the substantive validity of an ordinance. He may submit his
challenge to the governing body of the municipality with a request for a curative
amendment under section 609.1 of the MPC, id. § 10609.1, or he may appeal to the
zoning hearing board under sections 910 or 913.1, id. §§ 10910, 10913.1.
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that under the MPC procedures, mandamus is not a practical choice. This
impracticality stems from two hazards in the mandamus route, one caused
by the nature of the mandamus action, and the other caused by the effect
of the MPC upon the writ.
The first hazard is caused by the practical problems involved in proving
a "clear legal right" to relief in mandamus. 16 4 In a special legislation
action, this means that the landowner must prove: 1) that he applied for
his permit under the old ordinance; 2) that he was entitled to the permit
under the old ordinance; and 3) that the old ordinance is the law applicable
to his application. It is this last point, which in effect requires that the
landowner clearly prove that the new ordinance is not applicable to him
because it is unconstitutional special legislation, which creates the problems
for the plaintiff. As discussed previously,1 65 it is difficult for the landowner
to overcome the burdens of proof and the presumptions of validity sur-
rounding a zoning ordinance and to prove that the new ordinance is un-
constitutional in the face of the innumerable reasons offered by municipal
officials to show that the ordinance is related to the public health, safety,
or general welfare. In order to be entitled to mandamus, however, the
landowner must accomplish this task so convincingly as to persuade the
court that he is clearly entitled to the relief sought. 16  Whether this re-
quirement increases the already heavy burden on the landowner is an
unanswered, and perhaps unanswerable, question. Its mere existence,
however, is itself a deterrent to the choice of the mandamus route.
The second hazard to using mandamus is the MPC and its relation-
ship to rule 1095(6) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.'67
Rule 1095 sets forth the requirements for a complaint in mandamus and
includes, in subsection 6, the requirement that there be a "want of any
other adequate remedy at law."' 68 Thus, one risk which the landowner
seeking mandamus would face is that the court might find that the article
X appeal procedures in the MPC provide the challenger with an adequate
remedy at law for the adjudication of his special legislation claim. The
structuring of MPC procedures for landowner-initiated challenges increases
the possibility of such a ruling. The procedure for landowner challenges
to the substantive validity of zoning ordinances, such as special legislation
claims, is set out in section 1004 of the MPC. 6 9 That section authorizes
curative amendment requests under section 609.1 of the MPC,'' and
zoning hearing board appeals under sections 910 or 913.1,11 but it makes
no reference to section 909, which recognizes the right to proceed in
164. See note 160 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 136-58 supra.
166. See note 160 supra.
167. PA. R. Civ. P. 1095(6).
168. Id.
169. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004 (Purdon 1972).
170. Id. § 10609.1.
171. Id. §§ 10910, 10913.1.
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mandamus. 172 In addition, the developer choosing to sue in mandamus
runs the risk of having the court hold that section 1004 is the exclusive
remedy. Section 1001 states that the provisions set forth in article X
(which nowhere refer to section 909) "shall constitute the exclusive mode
of securing review of any ordinance, decision, determination or order of
"Y173the governing body of a municipality ....
Thus, under the MPC, the landowner is faced with two very real
deterrents to proceeding in mandamus and seeking discovery, as opposed
to proceeding under the MPC without discovery. Full discussion of these
deterrents, however, requires consideration of the results which could
ensue should mandamus be wrongly chosen.
It would appear that a decision denying mandamus on the ground
that an adequate remedy at law exists would delay, but would not be fatal
to, the landowner's cause. At the worst he would be forced to file a new
application and obtain a new refusal before proceeding. 17 4 Thereafter, he
could still adjudicate the challenge under the MPC.
17
However, a decision denying mandamus on the ground that the land-
owner did not have a "clear legal right" to relief could have graver reper-
cussions. Res judicata may be applicable in zoning cases, 170 and may
bar a subsequent action under the MPC in this situation. While this issue
is now unanswered, the deterrent effect of the possibility of such a result
virtually dictates the use of the MPC procedures, rather than mandamus,
to adjudicate special legislation claims. When the risks inherent in the
"adequate remedy at law" issue are also considered, the practitioner's
choice becomes clear: special legislation cases must proceed under the
MPC even though handicapped by the lack of discovery.
F. Remedies
Prior to the adoption of the MPC, when the mandamus action was a
viable method of challenging special legislation, 77 a landowner successful
172. Id. § 10909; see note 162 supra.
173. Id. § 11001 (emphasis added) ; see Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 404, 410, 333 A.2d 239, 242 (1975) ; Robin Corp. v. Board of Supervisors,
17 Pa. Commw. Ct. 386, 392-96, 332 A.2d 841, 845 (1975).
174. After an original permit refusal, the landowner has 30 days to appeal
through the MPC procedures. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11004(2) (b) (Purdon
1972). By the time a court, ruling on the landowner's mandamus action, would hold
he had an adequate remedy at law, the developer's MPC appeal period for that permit
would surely have passed. However, the rejection of one application for a permit
does not bar a second application for a permit. See Schubach v. Silver, 461 Pa. 336,
336 A.2d 328 (1975) ; R. RYAN, supra note 14, at § 9.4.17.
175. The denial of one permit is not res judicata for the appeal of the denial
of a later permit. R. RYAN, supra note 14, at § 9.4.17; see Schubach v. Silver, 461
Pa. 336, 336 A.2d 328 (1975).
176. See, e.g., Cheltenham Twp. Appeal, 413 Pa. 379, 196 A.2d 363 (1964) ; Grace
Bldg. Co. v. Hatfield Twp., 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 530, 329 A.2d 925 (1974). Even
though res judicata is normally held to be inapplicable to zoning challenges for the
reasons discussed in R. RYAN, supra note 14, at § 9.4.17, it is submitted that a manda-
mus denial based upon a finding of no clear legal right is the type of zoning challenge
to which res judicata could be applied.
177. See text accompanying notes 159-76 supra.
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in a mandamus action was entitled to a writ ordering the issuance of his
permit.' 78 Even though the MPC appears to make the writ of mandamus
an impractical remedy, 17 9 it does invest the courts with power to order
the approval of a proposed development in all its elements or to order
some elements approved and refer others to appropriate bodies or agencies
for further proceedings.' S0 This power to order definitive relief l s lies
regardless of the fact that plans and development applications are not in
the form otherwise required for final approval.' 8 2 Definitive relief, which
has been upheld in several cases,' 83 provides the courts with an excellent
tool with which to recompense developers whose planning and proposals
have been hindered by abuses of local legislative discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
For several years the doctrine of special legislation proved to be an
effective weapon against the discriminatory action of municipalities toward
unpopular developments. However, as municipal solicitors became aware
of the growing significance of the doctrine, they developed more sophisti-
cated methods of hiding discriminatory actions and became much more
conscious of their words and actions and the possible inferences which
could be drawn from them. This, coupled with certain practical problems
in proving special legislation, resulted in burdening landowners with an
almost insurmountable task in successfully proving their claims. It is sub-
mitted, however, that if discovery procedures are made available at the
start of the zoning hearing board process, if the shifting burden of proof
principle is extended to the special legislation area, if the courts clarify
that the proper test for special legislation is not proof of a "sole" purpose
but rather that the ordinance was "aimed directly" at the plaintiff regard-
less of its other alleged purposes, and if the mandamus action is reevaluated
in view of its emasculation by the MPC and made more viable, then the doc-
trine will remain a powerful tool with which to fight unlawful discrimination.
Michael Nelson Becci*
178. See Commercial Properties, Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 514 (1965)
note 160 supra.
179. See notes 159-76 and accompanying text supra.
180. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011(2) (Purdon 1972).
181. See generally Comment, Judicial Relief in Exclusionary Zoning Cases: Penn-
sylvania's Definitive Relief Approach, 21 VILL. L. REV. 701 (1976).
182. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 11011 (3) (Purdon 1972).
183. See, e.g., Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 230, 328 A.2d 464, 469
(1974), citing Order No. MP-12,271 (August 29, 1972), enforcing Girsh Appeal, 437
Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Ellick v. Board of Supervisors, 17 Pa. Commw. Ct.
404, 420-21, 333 A.2d 239, 249 (1975). See generally Comment, supra note 181.
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